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PARTIES TO THIS PROCEEDING 
The parties to this proceeding in the Third District 
Court were the plaintiffs, Dr. M. Dalton Cannon and Mrs. 
Patricia Cannon (the "Cannons"), and defendant the University of 
Utah (the "University"). Prior to the entry of judgment in this 
case, another defendant, Ms. Malissa K. Austin, settled with 
plaintiffs, and plaintiffs' claims against her were dismissed 
with prejudice. 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The only determinative statutory or rule provisions in 
this appeal are as follows: 
1. Rule 56(c), U. R. C. P. , which states as follows: 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. 
The motion shall be served at least 10 days 
before the time fixed for the hearing. The 
adverse party prior to the day of hearing may 
serve opposing affidavits. The judgment 
sought shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A 
summary judgment, interlocutory in character, 
may be rendered on the issue of liability 
alone although there is a genuine issue as to 
the amount of damages. (Emphasis added). 
2. Rule 6(d), U. R. C. P. , which states as follows: 
Rule 6. Time. 
(d) For motions -- Affidavits. A 
written motion, other than one which may be 
heard ex parte, and notice of the hearing 
thereof shall be served not later than 5 days 
before the time specified for the hearing, 
unless a different period is fixed by these 
rules or by order of the court. Such an 
order may for cause shown be made on ex parte 
application. When a motion is supported by 
affidavit, the affidavit shall be served with 
the motion; and, except as otherwise provided 
in Rule 59(c), opposing affidavits may be 
served not later than 1 day before the 
hearing, unless the court permits them to be 
served at some other time. (Emphasis added). 
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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
This is an appeal from a final judgment of the Third 
District Court for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Richard 
Moffat presiding. This appeal was originally taken to the Utah 
Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j). The 
appeal was subsequently assigned by the Utah Supreme Court to 
the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(4). The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of the appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues presented by this appeal, and the 
appropriate standard of review for each, are as follows: 
1. Did the trial court err in ruling in this 
negligence action that the University owed no duty of care to 
the Cannons, on the basis of the "public duty" doctrine? This 
issue presents a question of law, and the trial court' s decision 
is to be reviewed for correctness, without according deference 
to its conclusions. Bonham v. Morgan. 788 P. 2d 497, 499 (Utah 
1989); Jones v. American Coin Portfolios. Inc.. 709 P. 2d 303, 
306 (Utah 1985). 
2. Did the trial court err in ruling that the 
University owed no duty of care to the Cannons as business 
g:\wpc\160\00001hzb.W51 
invitees of the University? This issue also presents a question 
of law, and the standard of review is the same as for issue #1. 
3. Did the trial court rely upon disputed issues of 
material fact in ruling that the University owed no duty of care 
to the Cannons? In reviewing the trial court' s decision 
granting summary judgment, the Court of Appeals must view the 
facts in the record, together with all inferences fairly arising 
from the facts, in the light most favorable to the Cannons, and 
affirm only if there is no genuine issue of material fact. 
Provo Citv Corp. v. State, 795 P. 2d 1120, 1121 (Utah 1990). The 
trial court' s legal conclusions in granting summary judgment are 
reviewed simply for correctness, and no deference is accorded to 
such conclusions. Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 779 P. 2d 
634 (1979). 
4. Did the trial court err in striking the 
affidavits of Dr. Cannon and plaintiffs' traffic safety expert, 
Mr. David Lord, as untimely pursuant to U. R. C. P. Rule 6(d) and 
inadmissible under U. R. C. P. 56(e)? The issue of timeliness is a 
question of law, and subject to review for correctness without 
deference. The sufficiency of Dr. Cannon' s and Mr. Lord' s 
affidavits in the context of a motion for summary judgment is a 
-2-
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question of law. American Concept Ins. Co. v. Lockhead. 751 
P. 2d 271 (Utah App. 1988). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action arose from an auto-pedestrian accident on 
the University of Utah campus on the evening of February 1, 
1990. The appellants, Dr. M. Dalton Cannon and Mrs. Patricia 
Cannon, were en route to a University of Utah basketball game 
when they were struck by an automobile while using a crosswalk 
across South Campus Drive adjacent to the Huntsman Center. R. 
250-251.l The Cannons were critically injured, and remain 
seriously and permanently disabled. 
That evening, the University had specifically assigned 
two University of Utah police officers to assist pedestrians 
using the crosswalk across South Campus Drive en route to the 
basketball game, in accordance with the University' s normal 
practice. R. 327, 329. At the time of the accident, the 
officers were sitting in their car at the crosswalk talking. R. 
Citations to the record of proceedings before the trial court 




287, 329, 330. Neither officer attempted to assist the Cannons 
across the crosswalk, or tried to control approaching vehicular 
traffic. There was additional evidence that the officers had 
allowed flares marking the crosswalk to approaching vehicular 
traffic to burn down prior to the accident. R. 251, 327, 396. 
In deposition testimony, University police officers 
stated that it was the specific duty of officers assigned to the 
crosswalk prior to basketball games to assist pedestrians across 
the crosswalk and to control vehicular traffic in the immediate 
vicinity of the crosswalk. The officer supervising the accident 
investigation testified that this task could not be performed 
adequately without the officers being out of the police vehicle 
and actively involved in controlling pedestrian and vehicular 
traffic. 
Based on these and other facts, Dr. and Mrs. Cannon 
filed this action against the University for the injuries they 
suffered as a result of the negligent conduct of its employee 
police officers. The Cannons also sued the driver of the car 
that hit them, Ms. Malissa Austin. Prior to the entry of 
judgment in this case, Ms. Austin settled with the Cannons, 
leaving the University as the sole defendant. 
-4-
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B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
On February 11, 1992, the defendant University of Utah 
moved for summary judgment in this proceeding, claiming that the 
University officers owed no duty of care to the Cannons, and 
that any negligent conduct by the officers was not the proximate 
cause of the Cannons' injuries.2 By Memorandum Decision dated 
March 10, 1992, the Third District Court, Hon. Richard Moffat 
presiding, granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant 
University of Utah on the basis that the University officers 
owed no duty of care toward the Cannons pursuant to the "public 
duty" doctrine. R. 430-435. The court additionally rejected 
the Cannons claim that a duty of care was created by their 
status as business invitees of the University, and struck two 
affidavits filed by the Cannons in opposition to the 
University' s motion. Id. The Court made no ruling on the 
University' s claim that proximate causation was not present. 3 
2
 At the time of this motion, the parties stipulated to the 
voluntary dismissal of the Cannons' claims that the University had 
negligently failed to maintain adequate lighting and signage in the 
vicinity of the crosswalk. R. 436-437. 
3However, the Court stated that it was granting summary 
judgment on the duty of care issue, and for the reasons set forth 
in the University' s memorandum. This issue is discussed in Part 
IV. C. of the brief. 
-5-
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A Judgment and Order of Dismissal was entered by the 
Court on March 24, 1992. R. 441-442. The Cannons filed their 
Notice of Appeal on March 27, 1992. R. 443-446. On June 15, 
1992, this appeal was transferred by the Utah Supreme Court to 
the Utah Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Cannons were struck by an automobile while in 
a pedestrian crosswalk on the University of Utah campus en route 
to a University of Utah basketball game at approximately 6: 58 
p.m. on the evening of February 1, 1990. R. 176/ 250. The 
Cannons, who were in their late sixties at the time, were 
critically injured in the accident, and both are substantially 
and permanently disabled. R. 177. 
2. Two University of Utah police officers, Officer 
Kim Beglarian and Officer Brian Purvis, had been specifically 
assigned that evening to assist pedestrians across the crosswalk 
in question, which is located on South Campus Drive adjacent to 
the Huntsman Center. R, 327, 329. 
3. The Cannons had used the crosswalk prior to 
basketball games in the past, and police officers had generally 
-6-
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been at the crosswalk, with flares lit, actively directing 
traffic. R, 327. 
4. The lead investigator for the University Police 
Department, Officer Mike McPharlin, testified in his deposition 
that in order to perform their assigned crosswalk duties 
properly, the officers needed to have been out of their car. R. 
329. 
5. Officer McPharlin additionally stated that a 
pedestrian using the crosswalk should have had contact with the 
officers prior to using the crosswalk, because it was the duty 
of the officers to advise pedestrians when to cross. R. 329. It 
was the specific duty and responsibility of the officer to be on 
the lookout for pedestrian traffic, and to decide whether to 
stop the pedestrian. Id. 
6. Officer Beglarian acknowledged that their 
assignment specifically required the duty to assist pedestrians 
by stopping traffic until the pedestrians made it across the 
crosswalk. R. 327. Officer Beglarian further stated that the 
purpose of the officers' presence at the crosswalk was 
pedestrian safety. R. 329. Their normal procedure would have 
been to help the Cannons across the crosswalk. Id. The officers 
-7-
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were supposed to check pedestrian and vehicular traffic, and to 
stop one while the other proceeded. Id. 
7. That evening, the officers had been out of 
their car helping pedestrians, but had gotten back in their car 
prior to the time of the accident. R. 329. However, at the 
time of the accident, approximately 28 minutes after their 
duties commenced at 6:30 p.m. [R. 251], both officers were 
sitting in their car, trying to stay warm, talking and possibly 
listening to the radio. R. 287/ 329# 330. 
8. There were other pedestrians in the area at the 
time the accident occurred. R. 328. Officers Purvis and 
Beglarian would watch for pedestrians from their car, and then 
get out and assist them. R. 329. Even the presence of only one 
pedestrian would have triggered this obligation. R. 288. 
However, the Cannons walked directly in front of the officers' 
car seconds before the accident, and the officers did not see 
them. R. 328-330. 
9. Where it was located, their car would have 
partially blocked the view of westbound traffic of pedestrians 
using the crosswalk. R. 330. Officer Beglarian did not believe 
that lighting at the crosswalk was adequate. R. 330. 
-8-
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10. The purpose of the flares set by the officers was 
to warn approaching traffic of pedestrians. R. 330. Although 
the officers stated that the flares they had set to mark the 
crosswalk to approaching traffic were still burning (albeit 
burning down), neither Dr. Cannon nor the driver of the vehicle, 
Ms. Malissa Austin, saw flares burning at the time of the 
accident. R. 327. 
11. The officers set flares out at the crosswalk when 
they arrived at the crosswalk around 6: 30. R. 251. Flares such 
as those used can burn out in 25 minutes or less in adverse 
weather conditions. R. 396. It had been snowing or raining 
intermittently as recently as five to ten minutes before the 
accident. R. 396. According to Dr. Cannon, the officers' car 
did not have its flashers on, although one of the officers 
stated that they had their amber flashers on. R. 289/ 293. The 
investigating officer testified that normally the car' s red and 
blue emergency lights should have been on to alert vehicular 
traffic of activity in the area. R. 367. 
12. Men' s basketball games at the University of Utah 
are revenue-producing events for which admission is generally 
charged. The general public is invited, and the University 
-9-
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promotes the games using radio and television advertising, in 
order to increase attendance. R. 371. 
13. The University makes parking areas on the south 
side of South Campus Drive, across from the Huntsman Center, 
available for use by spectators attending University basketball 
games. R. 371. The Cannons utilized this parking on the night 
of the accident, and were proceeding northbound to the Huntsman 
Center, attempting to cross South Campus Drive, when they were 
hit. R. 426-428. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
In ruling upon a motion for summary judgment, a court 
is required to view all facts, and the inferences that can be 
drawn from those facts, in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party. The Cannons presented the Court with facts 
clearly establishing the existence of a duty of care owed to 
them by the University police officers assigned to guard the 
crosswalk where the accident occurred. 4 The trial court 
4
 The Cannons believe that the deposition testimony set forth 
in their Memorandum In Opposition to the Defendant' s Motion for 
Summary Judgment was alone sufficient to preclude summary judgment. 
The trial court erroneously struck two additional affidavits filed 
by the Cannons in opposition to the University's motion. These 
affidavits provided a ^ itional admissible factual material 
precluding summary judgment, and should have been considered by the 
court. See Part IV, infra. 
-10-
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instead founded its ruling upon facts disputed by the Cannons, 
and reached legal conclusions that were contrary to the record 
before it. Its decision should be reversed and this case 
remanded for trial. 
The trial court' s decision was based primarily upon 
the "public duty" doctrine set forth in Ferree v. State. 784 P. 
2d 149 (Utah 1989). Based upon that doctrine, the court ruled 
that the Cannons had failed to prove that the University owed 
them some specific duty of care, rather than a general duty owed 
to members of the public to ensure traffic safety. The trial 
court' s ruling glosses over a crucial and undisputed fact: the 
police officers in question were specifically assigned to assist 
pedestrians across the crosswalk prior to the basketball game, 
thus creating a duty of care toward those pedestrians. The law 
is clear that when a governmental entity voluntarily assumes a 
task, it assumes a duty to perform that task non-negligently. 
The officers admitted that their assignment required active 
involvement with pedestrians and vehicles at the crosswalk, yet 
they were sitting in their car talking and listening to the 
radio at the time of the accident. Their negligence is 
difficult to dispute. 
-11-
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The trial court shoehorned this case into the public 
duty doctrine by relying upon the University' s arguable lack of 
a duty to provide traffic control at the crosswalk in the first 
place.5 The court equated the absence of a duty to assign the 
officers to the crosswalk in the first place with the officers' 
failure to perform their assigned task once they got there. 
Because the University had no duty to provide traffic control/ 
the officers also had no duty to do so, despite their 
assignment. This premise both misstates the law and relies on 
disputed facts. The officers were in fact engaged that evening 
in traffic control; the evidence shows that they simply were 
failing to do so competently at the time of the accident. The 
Cannons also suggest that this ruling is highly undesirable from 
a policy standpoint; the trial court would relieve governmental 
employees from liability only if they completely ignored their 
assigned task. Finally, the trial court disregarded factual 
evidence that the officers were actively negligent, by parking 
their car in a manner that obscured pedestrians from oncoming 
5
 The Cannons contend that their status as business invitees 
of the University created a duty of care in the University' s 
employees to act non-negligently when on property owned or occupied 
by the University. See Part IV, infra. 
-12-
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traffic and by allowing marker flares to burn down or out at the 
crosswalk. 6 
As business invitees of the University, the Cannons 
were also entitled to have the University and its employees 
exercise due care to protect their safety in all areas under the 
University' s control. The trial court denied this claim because 
the street underlying the crosswalk is owned by the Utah 
Department of Transportation, not the University. However, 
applicable law (as expressed in the Restatement 2d of Torts) 
provides that occupation of property, not ownership, is 
determinative when an invitee relationship is alleged. The 
University police officers were clearly in occupation and 




THE "PUBLIC DUTY" DOCTRINE IS INAPPLICABLE 
WHERE A RISK OP HARM TO IDENTIFIABLE 
INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS ARISES FROM THE 
DEFENDANT' S NEGLIGENT CONDUCT 
6
 The Cannons flatly dispute, on the basis of convincing 
deposition testimony, that the marker flares were still burning at 
the time of the accident, yet the trial court stated that there was 
"sufficient evidence" to believe the contrary. R. 433. The court's 
weighing of the evidence is improper on summary judgment. 
-13-
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A. The Public Duty Doctrine In Utah. 
The "public duty" doctrine, upon which the trial 
court's decision was based, has been the subject of considerable 
litigation in Utah' s courts in recent years. See e. a. Rollins v. 
Petersen. 813 P. 2d 1156, 1162 (Utah 1991); Ferree v. State. 784 
P. 2d 149 (Utah 1989); Little v. Utah State Piv. of Family 
g^ryices, 667 P. 2d 49 (Utah 1983); Lflfligirr Yt Utah P9Ptt Of 
Transportation, 828 P. 2d 535 (Utah 1992). The public duty 
doctrine has been succinctly defined as stating that "a duty to 
all is a duty to none. " Lamarr. supra. 828 P. 2d at 539.7 The 
Utah Supreme Court has defined the doctrine more broadly as 
follows: 
For a governmental agency and its agents to 
be liable for a negligently caused injury 
suffered by a member of the public, the 
plaintiff must show a breach of duty owed 
him as an individual, not merely the breach 
of an obligation owed to the general public 
at large by the governmental official. 
Ferree v. State, supra. 784 P. 2d at 151. 
In the absence of a specific rather than a general 
duty, the "special relationship" necessary for a duty of care is 
not present. £££ Beach v. University of Utah. 726 P. 2d 413 
7
 Citing Rollins v. Petersen. 813 P. 2d 1156, 1165 (Utah 
1991)(Durham, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
-14-
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(Utah 1986). Because the existence of a duty of care is an 
essential element of a negligence claim, the public duty 
doctrine, if applicable, precludes a plaintiff from recovering 
damages for negligence from a governmental employee. 8 
The Cannons agree that the public duty doctrine, as it 
has been stated by Utah' s appellate courts, remains the law in 
Utah.9 In this case, however, the trial court misinterpreted 
the doctrine, and additionally relied upon disputed material 
facts to apply it to the Cannons, Summary judgment was 
therefore inappropriate. 
B. Lack of An Identifiable Risk of Harm to Specific 
Individuals or Groups la the Common Factor In Utah' s 
Reported Public Duty Cases. 
The reported Utah public duty cases have been based 
upon a factual pattern that is clearly distinguishable from the 
instant case. Where the courts have found the public duty 
doctrine applicable, there has been no identifiable person or 
8
 Sovereign immunity is not an issue in this appeal. The 
University admits that it may be held liable for the negligent acts 
or omissions of its employees, Officers Purvis and Beglarian. R. 
257. 
9
 In Rollins, supra. Justice Durham of the Utah Supreme Court 
argued in her partial dissent for the abolition of the public duty 
doctrine. Other western states have abolished the doctrine in 
recent years. See e. g. Leake v. Cain. 720 P. 2d 152 (Colo- 1986). 
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class of persons that forseeably could be harmed by the 
allegedly negligent conduct. The distinction is crucial. In 
Ferree v. State, 784 P. 2d 149 (Utah 1989), the case upon which 
the trial court here based its ruling, an inmate at a community 
corrections facility became intoxicated and murdered a total 
stranger while on a weekend release. The victim' s family sued 
the Department of Corrections, claiming that the Department' s 
negligence in supervising the inmate' s release was a proximate 
cause of the victim' s death. The Utah Supreme Court held that 
the Department did not owe a duty of care to the decedent, 
because the Department of Corrections' general duty to protect 
public safety could not extend to the protection of unknown 
parties from future violent acts by parolees, in the absence of 
knowledge that a specific individual or group might be in 
danger. 
In Rollins v. Petersen, 813 P. 2d 1156 (Utah 1991), an 
escaped mental patient injured the plaintiff, a stranger, in a 
car accident on Interstate 15. The Supreme Court understandably 
held that the defendant mental health facility' s duty to 
exercise care in controlling patients did not create any 
enforceable duty to unidentifiable persons who might somehow be 
injured after an escape. In Lamarr v. Utah Dept. of 
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Transportation, 828 P. 2d 535 (Utah App. 1992), the plaintiff 
was harassed by transients under the North Temple viaduct in 
Salt Lake City, leading him to avoid the pedestrian walkway by 
walking on the roadway, where he was subsequently hit by a car. 
He then claimed that the city had a duty to control the 
transient population to prevent injuries to persons such as 
himself. The Court of Appeals held that the City had no way of 
knowing of Lamarr' s activities, and no reason to distinguish 
Lamarr from any other member of the public, so no duty of care 
existed. 828 P. 2d at 540. 
These cases all involve a common and readily 
distinguishable fact pattern. The defendants, while having a 
general duty to perform their duties properly, had no means of 
identifying the persons who might be harmed by their alleged 
negligence. In the absence of a person or persons who could 
forseeably be harmed, no actionable duty of care could be found 
to exist. In contrast, where there is a reasonably identifiable 
risk of harm to a specific person or group, a "special 
relationship" giving rise to a duty of care exists. Rollins. 
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gwra, 813 P. 2d at 1162. 5£S. frlgp Little v. Utah State 
Division of Family Services, supra, 667 P. 2d 49. 10 
The Court should note that, in order to escape the 
public duty doctrine, the plaintiff need not be identifiable as 
an individual. Instead, the plaintiff need merely be part of a 
reasonably identifiable group. Rollins v. Petersen, 813 P. 2d 
1156, 1162 (Utah 1991). The Court in Rollins indicated that if 
harm was likely to a distinct group as a result of a 
governmental defendant' s failure to act with due care, an 
actionable duty of care existed toward that group. Id. 
c. Pedestrians Using the Crosswalk Clearly Were At Rial; 
As a Result of The Officers7 Negligence. 
The trial court' s Memorandum Decision is based in 
large part upon the conclusion that the Cannons proved no duty 
on the part of the officers toward them as specific individuals, 
rather than as members of the general public, R. 433. Under 
Rollins, the Cannons were not required to do so; they instead 
simply needed to show that they were part of an identifiable 
class of people which was forseeably at risk. See also 18 E. 
10
 In Little, the Supreme Court found that a governmental 
social agency was liable for harm to a child in foster care, where 
the possibility of harm to that child from the agency' s negligent 
acts was foreseeable. 
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McQuillen, The Law of Municipal Corporations. Sec. 53. 04b at 165 
(3d Ed. 1985)(duty can exist to class of individuals as well as 
individual persons). 
On appeal from a grant of summary judgment, the facts 
in the record, and all fair inferences from those facts, must be 
viewed in the light most favorable to the appellant. The record 
here demonstrates that the University recognized the danger to 
pedestrians crossing busy campus streets immediately prior to 
University basketball games. In order to protect those 
pedestrians, it assigned University police to guard the South 
Campus Drive crosswalk prior to the games. Those officers were 
specifically aware that their assigned task was to be out of 
their car advising pedestrians when to cross the crosswalk and 
stopping vehicular traffic. On the night of the accident, the 
weather had been bad, and visibility was poor, increasing the 
risks of an auto-pedestrian accident. The officers were aware 
of the danger that the crosswalk presented under the 
circumstances. The officers obviously could have foreseen that 
game spectators using the crosswalk (an identifiable class of 
individuals) would be subject to harm if the officers failed to 
perform their crossing duties competently. Under Rollins, the 




THE PUBLIC DUTY DOCTRINE IS INAPPLICABLE, 
BECAUSE THE DIVERSITY ASSUMED A DUTY OP 
CARE TO PEDIJTRIANS AT THE CROSSWALK BY 
ASSIGNING OFFICERS TO GUARD IT. 
A. Once A Governmental Entity Voluntarily Assumes A Task. 
It Is Required to Perform That Task In A Non-Negligent 
Manner. 
The public duty doctrine involves an inquiry into 
whether the relationship between the parties gives rise to a 
duty of care. In this case, however, there is no need for such 
inquiry, because the University expressly assumed a duty to act 
non-negligently when it assigned the officers to guard the 
crosswalk on the evening of the accident. Once a government 
entity assumes a specific duty towards individuals, it has an 
obligation to act with due care. filling, supra, citing Little 
v. Utah State Division of Family Services. 667 P. 2d 49 (Utah 
1983). This principle was recently discussed by the Court of 
Appeals in Jones Vt PovmUfyq QitY, 187 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 
P. 2d (Utah App. 1992). In Jones. the plaintiff claimed 
that the city of Bountiful should have erected signage to 
prevent accidents at an intersection known to be dangerous. The 
Court of Appeals rejected this contention, but stated that once 
the City did choose to erect signs, it had a duty to do so in a 
non-negligent manner. 187 Utah Adv. Rep. at 24, citing 19 E. 
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McQuillen, The Law of Municipal Corporations Sec. 54. 28b at 90 
(3d Ed. 1985). 
Other courts have similarly ruled that where a 
governmental entity assumes the responsibility of providing some 
service, it concurrently assumes a duty of care to provide that 
service competently. In Florence v. Goldberg. 375 N. E. 2d. 763 
(N. Y. App. 1978), the defendant school district supplied a 
crossing guard near a public school for several weeks, but then 
negligently failed to schedule a guard on a particular day. In 
the absence of the guard, a child was forced to cross 
unassisted, and was hit by a car. The New York court expressly 
held that the public duty doctrine did not apply to prevent the 
school board from being held liable. It noted that the 
municipality might have had no duty in the first place to 
provide a crossing guard for the protection of the public. 
However, once the defendant voluntarily assumed the task, it had 
the duty to perform the task non-negligently. 375 N. E. 2d at 
766; &££. fil&fi VefrCft Vr CitY Qf Phpenix, 427 P. 2d 335 (Ariz. 
1967). 
The trial court recognized that officers Purvis and 
Beglarian had been assigned by their superiors to help people 
across South Campus Drive. R. 434. However, it then ruled that 
-21-
g:\wpc\160\00001hzb.W51 
the assumption of this obligation did not extend the duty 
otherwise owed by the officers. Id. This ruling confuses the 
University' s original obligation to provide traffic control in 
the first place with performance of that task. Under the public 
duty rule, the University may arguably have had no obligation to 
provide traffic control at the crosswalk in the first place. n 
Once it chose to do so, however, it had an obligation to do so 
competently and non-negligently. Utah' s law is clear that the 
University' s failure to fulfil its voluntarily assumed duty to 
this group is actionable under relevant law. See Rollins, 
?VPya; Little v. Utah State Division of Family Services, gyiprft, 
667 P. 2d at 53-54. 
The University police officer investigating the 
accident, Officer Mike McPharlin, acknowledged that an officer 
could protect pedestrians only by being out of the car and 
halting pedestrians at the curb while traffic passed. Instead, 
officers Purvis and Beglarian were sitting in their car with the 
heater on, talking and perhaps listening to the radio. This 
forced the Cannons to attempt to cross the street without the 
11
 The Cannons contend that the University and its employees 
had a duty of care to invitees to its athletic events, and that 
this duty existed independently of whether any duty of care was 
assumed by the University. See Part VI, infra. 
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normal level of police assistance, with catastrophic results. 
The University undertook to protect the safety of pedestrians 
using the Huntsman Center crosswalk. This created a "special 
relationship" between the University and those pedestrians. A 
duty to exercise reasonable care to protect pedestrians at the 
crosswalk existed under the circumstances. 
Other courts dealing with crosswalk accidents have had 
no hesitancy in ruling that, once the government undertakes to 
provide crosswalk safety, it assumes a duty of care to those 
using the crosswalk. Alhambra School District v. Superior Court, 
796 P. 2d 470, 474 (Ariz. 1990). The Alhambra court stated: 
Although pedestrians are not absolutely 
required to use crosswalks to cross a 
street, it is certainly foreseeable that 
pedestrians might conclude . . . that use of a 
marked crosswalk would be the prudent thing 
to do. A pedestrian might reasonably rely 
on the added safety of a marked crosswalk -
particularly a school crosswalk, with its 
additional protections. 
We conclude, therefore, that in creating the 
mayfrefl CypggWfrlk Where none previously 
exAstefl, the District created a relationship 
with those who would use the crosswalk, and 
thereby 3gg\unefl » forty Qi refrgonfrfrle ggtpe 
with respect to its operation. 796. P. 2d at 
474 (Emphasis added). 
In the case at bar, not only was there a marked 
crosswalk, but also uniformed University police officers whose 
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sole function was to make pedestrian crossings safe. The 
Cannons had used the crosswalk for years, and had always been 
afforded this protection. It is apparent that the University 
assumed the duty of protecting "those who would use the 
crosswalk, and thereby assumed a duty of reasonable care with 
respect to its operation. " Alhambra School District, supra. 796 
P. 2d at 474. 
The facts and law set forth in Alhambra and Florence 
are directly on point here. The University may not have been 
obligated under law to provide police protection at the 
crosswalk, but it chose to assume responsibility for doing so. 
It specifically assigned two officers to do one thing - protect 
pedestrian safety at the crosswalk on that evening. The 
officers then utterly failed to comply with the duties they were 




THE TRIAL COURT RELIED UPON 
DISPUTED PACTS, AND IGNORED 
MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT RAISED BY 
THE CANNONS 
A. The Trial Court's Ruling Is Based Upon A Misconception 
of the Facte. 
As one of the foundations of its ruling, the trial 
relied upon the factual conclusion that the officers were not 
engaged in traffic control activities at the time of the 
accident. R. 434. The court somehow equated the officers' 
failure to perform their assigned task at the crosswalk with the 
University' s arguable lack of a duty to send them there in the 
first place. Id. The court' s logic is faulty; it is the 
equivalent of ruling that a lifeguard who stays in his chair 
when he sees a drowning child should be absolved from liability 
because he was not conducting lifesaving activities. More 
importantly, the court was making an inherently factual 
determination concerning what the officers were and should have 
been doing. This is an issue of material fact sufficient to bar 
summary judgment. Barnes Co. v. Sohio Natural Resources. 627 P. 
2d 56, 59 (1981)(a single issue of material fact is sufficient 
to prevent summary judgment). 
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The trial court' s ruling reflects the University' s 
argument that, because the officers were sitting in their car 
rather than directing traffic as assigned, the Cannons did not 
rely upon their presence in attempting to cross the street. The 
University relies on a brief statement in Dr. Cannon' s 
deposition, in which he stated that when he and his wife arrived 
at the crosswalk, the police who were usually present to assist 
them were nowhere in evidence. As a result, they were forced to 
cross the street without assistance, and were hit in the 
crosswalk. 
Even if taken as true, the contention that the Cannons 
did not rely on the officers to cross the street does not 
absolve the officers of responsibility. In Florence v. 
Goldberg, supra, the Court found liability where no officers had 
been present at a crosswalk; the omission of assistance was the 
determinative factor. Here, the investigating officer clearly 
indicated that it was necessary for the officers to be out of 
their car stopping traffic and/or pedestrians to perform their 
assigned task effectively. One of the officers similarly 
acknowledged that they needed to meet and stop pedestrians in 
the face of oncoming traffic to perform their assigned task 
effectively. Their assigned duty also included advising 
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pedestrians when to cross the street. The fact that the Cannons 
were been forced by the officers' inaction to cross the street 
without assistance is itself indicative of a negligent failure 
to act. In this situation, a duty of care includes the 
obligation to act affirmatively if necessary to prevent injury 
to those entrusted to the actor' s care. See Prosser & Keeton On 
Torts § 56 at 376-377 (5th Lawyers Ed. 1984). In any event, this 
is an inherently factual determination, and one that is disputed 
by the Cannons. 12 
B. The Existence of ft Duty of Care Is a Question of Fact 
The Cannons agree that the existence of a duty of care 
is generally an issue of law. However, when the facts upon 
which the issue must be decided are in dispute, summary judgment 
is improper. Egtfrte pf TgiAfrgiieviQh yt City gf HMfflpnfl, 383 
12
 In his affidavit, stricken by the Court as untimely and 
immaterial, Dr. Cannon stated that one of the reasons that the 
Cannons used the crosswalk in question was the availability of 
police assistance in crossing the street. The Cannon affidavit 
clearly raises material factual questions concerning the issue of 
reliance. The Cannons have appealed the trial court' s striking of 
his affidavit, because it was filed in accordance with the time 
requirements of U. R. C. P. 6(d), and was otherwise admissible. 
However, the Cannons believe that the Court of Appeals can decide 




N. E. 2d 1081 (Ind. App. 1978). In that case, the court denied 
summary judgment to a governmental entity that claimed that the 
public duty ru~e absolved it of liability to the plaintiff. The 
court noted that disputes of fact existed concerning whether 
there was some reasonably apparent danger to the plaintiff that 
might create a duty. 383 N. E. 2d at 1085. Similar disputes 
exist here. 
The Court should also note that the officers' failure 
to assist the Cannons is not the only allegation of negligence 
here. The Cannons contend that the officers had allowed marker 
flares at the crossing to burn down or go out, increasing the 
likelihood that a driver would be unable to see the Cannons, or 
be placed on notice o: a potential hazard. Neither the Cannons 
nor the driver of the car saw flares, and even the officers 
admitted that the flares were burning down. There was further 
evidence that the flares could burn down in 25 minutes or less 
in wet and windy conditions such as the night in question, which 
could lead to the inference that the flares were not burning at 
the time of the accident. 13 Yet the trial court stated as a 
13
 The Cannons also con^nd that the officers also parked in 
the middle lane of South Campus Drive, obscuring pedestrians from 
the view of westbound drivers. Together with the officers' failure 
to perform their assigned task of actively assisting pedestrians 
across the crosswalk, these negligent acts made it highly 
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basis for its ruling that "...there is sufficient evidence to 
believe that there were flares burning in the crosswalk. ..." R. 
433. This sort of weighing of disputed evidence is improper on 
summary judgment, and justifies reversal. See Barnes Co. v. 
Sohio Natural Resources, supra. 627 P. 2d at 59. 
C. The Trial Court's Decision la Bad Public Policy. 
The trial court' s decision, if affirmed by this court, 
would create a disincentive toward safe behavior by governmental 
employees. To perform their assigned job, officers Purvis and 
Beglarian admittedly had to be out of their car, stopping 
traffic or pedestrians until the other passed. They failed to 
do so. Yet the trial court relied on their nonfeasance as a 
factor supporting its ruling. The court reasoned that, because 
the officers were not performing their duty, the Cannons could 
not have relied upon them, and no duty of care existed. This 
ruling would discourage active involvement in protecting public 
safety, and reward those who shirk their duties. By remaining 
removed from potentially dangerous situations, an employee could 
escape liability entirely, while taking action to protect public 
foreseeable that a driver could hit the Cannons. 
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safety would pose higher risks of litigation. This is exactly 
the opposite of what the Utah legislature has sought to 
encourage with the Utah "Good Samaritan Act" and other 
legislation. Sound public policy dictates that the trial 
court' s ruling be set aside. 
IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN STRIKING DR. 
CANNON' S AFFIDAVIT 
A. The Affidavit WAS Timely. 
The hearing on the University' s Motion for Summary 
Judgment was held on Friday, March 6, 1992. The University 
filed and served its reply memorandum in the case on the 
afternoon of Wednesday, March 4. In that reply memorandum, the 
University raised in detail for the first time factual and legal 
contentions concerning the Cannons' reliance upon the officers' 
presence at the crosswalk. To rebut these contentions, the 
Cannons the next day filed the Affidavit of M. Dalton Cannon. 
The affidavit was filed and served upon counsel for the 
defendant on the afternoon of Thursday, March 5, the day before 
the hearing. R. 382-383. 14 
14
 Defendant' s counsel states he received the affidavit at 
approximately 2:30 p. m. that Thursday. 
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The University moved to strike the affidavit as 
untimely under Rule 6(d) U. R. C. P. . and the trial court agreed. 
This ruling was incorrect. Rule 6(d) U. R. C. P. allows affidavits 
in opposition to a motion for summary judgment to be filed not 
later than 1 day before the hearing, unless otherwise allowed by 
the Court. This rule must be interpreted in conjunction with 
Rule 56(c) U. R. C. P. , which states: "The adverse party prior to 
the date of hearing may serve opposing affidavits." (emphasis 
added). These rules by their terms permit affidavits in 
opposition to a motion for summary judgment to be served at any 
time prior to the day of hearing. Accord Beaufort Concrete Co. 
yt Atlantic States CQnStfft COt , 352 F. 2d 460, 462 (5th Cir. 
1965)(interpreting identical federal rules). The affidavits 
were timely as a matter of law. 
B. Dr. Cannot s Affidavit Was Otherwise Admissible. 
The trial court also adopted without comment the 
University's objections that Dr. Cannon's affidavit was 
contradictory to his deposition testimony, and immaterial. It 
is neither. 15 Dr. Cannon' s affidavit stated that, at past 
15
 The immateriality objection should be disposed of summarily. 
The University makes the circular objection that the affidavit is 
immaterial because the University had no duty of care to the 
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University basketball games, he and his wife had used the same 
crosswalk and had taken advantage of the assistance of 
University police in crossing South Campus Drive. Para. 4, R. 
383. On the night in question, one reason that they used the 
South Campus Drive parking lots and crosswalk was the 
availability of police protection at the crosswalks. Para. 5. 
On the night of the accident, they did not see the officers at 
the crosswalk, but did see their automobile. 16 Dr. Cannon then 
stated that, had the officers been available at the crosswalk, 
the Cannons would have followed their directions. In their 
absence, the Cannons were forced to fend for themselves in 
crossing the street. R. 383. 
The University contends that these statements should 
have been held inadmissible on the basis of Webster v. Still. 
675 P. 2d 1170 (Utah 1983). In Webster, the Utah Supreme Court 
stated that when a party takes a clear position in a deposition, 
he may not thereafter raise an issue of fact by his own 
Cannons. R. 421. However, the University7 s own arguments concern 
the issues raised in the affidavit - e. g. reliance. The affidavit 
clearly involves material issues; that is why the University seeks 
to bar its admission. 
16The officers were inside the automobile at the time. This 
is another indication of how dark the crosswalk area was, a fact 
that should have led the officers to take additional precautions to 
ensure pedestrian safety in the crossing. 
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contradictory affidavit. 675 P. 2d at 1172-3. Yet the Webster 
court went on to state that this rule should be applied 
cautiously, and only when there is an unequivocal contradiction 
between deposition testimony and an affidavit. 675 P. 2 at 1173. 
The Court of Appeals has exercised similar caution in refusing 
to strike affidavits that could raise issues of fact. Gaw v. 
State bv and through DOT. 798 P. 2d 1130, 1140-1 (Utah App. 
1990). 
Upon review of the affidavit and the allegedly 
inconsistent statements, it becomes apparent that there are no 
inconsistencies of any consequence. R. 383; cf. R. 422. In his 
affidavit, Dr. Cannon stated that one of the reasons the Cannons 
parked where they did was the availability of police assistance 
in crossing South Campus Drive. The University somehow argues 
that this testimony was contradicted by his statement that he 
and his wife would arrive early to get a good parking place and 
avoid the crowds. It similarly sees a contradiction in Dr. 
Cannon' s testimony that other parking areas involved climbing 
stairs. These statements are neither directly contradictory to 
nor mutually exclusive with his affidavit statement that one of 




Summary judgment is a harsh remedy, and the court is 
required to resolve all doubts in favor of the party opposing 
the motion. Durham v. Maraetts, 571 P. 2d 1332 (Utah 1977). The 
Utah Supreme Court in Webster made it clear that it is not the 
task of the trial court to weigh evidence at the summary 
judgment stage. Unless the inconsistency is completely 
implausible, it is the finder of fact that must weigh the 
credibility of the explanation. Gaw, supra. 798 P. 2d at 1141. 
Accordingly, an affidavit should be disregarded only if there is 
a direct and clear contradiction to prior testimony. 675 P. 2d 
at 1172-3. No such direct contradiction exists here; in fact, 
there is no inconsistency whatsoever between Dr. Cannon' s 
testimony and his affidavit. The affidavit raised a clear and 
material issue of fact concerning the Cannon' s reliance on the 
officers' presence in choosing where to park. The trial court 
erred in striking Dr. Cannon' s affidavit. 
c The Lord Affidavit Should Also Have Been Admitted. 
The affidavit of David Lord, the plaintiffs' traffic 
safety expert, concerns the issue of proximate cause. In it he 
states that his expert opinion was that, had the officers acted 
in accordance with their assigned tasks and without negligence, 
by stopping them or the oncoming vehicle, the Cannons would not 
-34-
g:\wpc\160\00001hzb.W51 
have been injured. R. 37-381. As noted previously, the trial 
court made no express ruling on the issue of proximate cause, 
but did adopt the defendant' s memorandum. R. 435. 
The Court of Appeals, to the extent that it is 
necessary to address proximate causation, can find a material 
issue of fact on the issue of causation even without the Lord 
Affidavit. In virtually all cases, including this one, 
causation is a factual issue to be determined by the jury. 
Apache Tank Lines. Inc. v. Chenev, 706 P. 2d 614 (Utah 1985). 
The Lord affidavit meets all the requirements for an expert' s 
affidavit set forth in American Concept Ins. Co. v. Lockhead, 
751 P. 2d 271 (Utah App. 1988), and clearly raises factual 
questions concerning causation. Even if it did not, the 
officers' admitted failure to assist the Cannons raises the same 
issues of fact. Summary judgment is also improper on the 
causation issue. 
V. 
THE CANNONS WERE BUSINESS INVITEES OF THE 
UNIVERSITY, REQUIRING THE UNIVERSITY TO 




The trial court rejected the Cannon's claims that the 
University owed them a duty of care as business invitees because 
the University does not own the roadway underlying the crosswalk 
where the accident occurred. The Cannons, as paying customers 
of the University basketball program, were clearly business 
invitees; mens basketball games are promoted to the public by 
the University, with the purpose of raising attendance and 
thereby ticket revenue. R. 371. gee Stevens v. Salt Lake County. 
478 P. 2d 496, 498 (Utah 1970)(business invitee is one who goes 
on the premises of another for some business of mutual 
advantage). With respect to such invitees, the business is 
expected to exercise a high degree of care to assure their 
safety. Id. at 498. The Court should note that the owner-
invitee relationship is a "special relationship" creating a duty 
of care. DCR, Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co. , 663 P. 2d 433, 435 (Utah 
1983). This relationship provides an entirely independent basis 
for imposing a duty of care on the University. 17 
The trial court denied the existence of a duty of care 
to the Cannons as invitees because the Utah Department of 
17
 Those who attend university events for a fee stand in the 
status of invitees. Peterson v. San Francisco Community College. 
685 P. 2d 1193 (Cal. 1984); see also Cimino v. Yale University, 638 
F. Supp. 952, 955 (D. Conn. 1986). 
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Transportation ("UDOT"), not the University, owns South Campus 
Drive. R. 432. The trial court' s reliance on ownership of the 
street is misplaced. Section 344 of the Restatement (2d) of 
Torts makes it clear that occupancy, not ownership, of the 
premises is the test for whether a special relationship arises: 
A possessor of land who holds it open for 
his business purposes is subject to 
liability to members of the public while 
they are on the land for such a purpose, for 
physical harm caused bv the accidental, 
negligent, or intentionally harmful acts of 
thiyfl person? py {tnim»jLgg »nfl by the failure 
of the possessor to exercise reasonable care 
(b) give a warning adequate to 
protect the visitors to avoid the 
harm, or otherwise to protect them 
against it. 
Restatement (2d) of Torts, § 344 (emphasis added). 
The University, through its officers, was in active 
possession of the crosswalk at the time the accident occurred. 
The University, not UDOT, had specifically undertaken to operate 
the crosswalk in question. UDOT was not shown to have any input 
into how or when pedestrians would be provided with police 
protection; that task was assumed solely by the University. 
In light of the significant level of involvement that 
the University had with the crosswalk, this is hardly an 
expansion of the law governing invitees. The University 
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actively promotes public attendance at its basketball games. As 
part of this activity, it makes parking lots on the south side 
of South Campus Drive available to basketball fans. To get to 
the game, those fans must cross South Campus Drive. The 
University expressly recognized that this crossing posed a 
danger to them, and assigned police to guard the crosswalks. In 
a very real sense, it "held open" the crosswalk to its invitees 
for its own business purposes. The fact that the University did 
not hold title to the underlying roadway is irrelevant in light 
of its recognition of the danger and its undertaking to provide 
protection at the crosswalk for its invitees. Under Restatement 
§ 344 and the law of invitees, the University and its employees 
had a duty of care towards the Cannons, a duty which they failed 
to fulfil. 
In finding that no invitee relationship existed, the 
trial court also relied upon the Cannons' withdrawal of their 
claim against the University based upon ownership of South 
Campus Drive. R. 432. This argument is misplaced. The claim 
withdrawn by the Cannons concerned the possible lack of adequate 
signage and lighting at the crosswalk, an issue within the 
admitted responsibility of UDOT. This issue has no connection 
with the University' s failure to use reasonable care to protect 
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those invitees who were using a crosswalk staffed by University 
employees to go to from a University parking lot to a University 
sports facility. The dismissal of the inadequate maintenance 
claims is irrelevant. 
CONCLUSION 
There is little question that the University of Utah 
recognized the danger to pedestrians arising from the use of the 
Huntsman Center crosswalks prior to evening basketball games. 
To alleviate this danger, it assigned University police to the 
crosswalks to assist spectators in reaching the Huntsman Center. 
On the evening of February 1, 1990, the University' s officers 
utterly failed to comply with their assigned task, resulting in 
devastating injuries to the Cannons. The University is not 
entitled to escape responsibility for its officers' negligent 
performance of a duty that the University expressly assumed. 
The University owed the Cannons a duty of care. The trial 
court' s decision should be reversed, and the Cannons given an 
opportunity to prove their case. 
DATED this i^  day of August, 1992. 
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VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Michael F. Richman (4180) 
John W. Andrews (4724) 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
-40-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused four true and correct 
copies of the within and foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANTS to be 
hand-delivered this j^ day of AUGUST, 1992, to the following: 
Brent A. Burnett 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
M. DALTON CANNON and : MINUTE ENTRY 
PATRICIA CANNON, 
: Case No. 900902128 PI 
Plaintiffs, 
: JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT 
vs. 
THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, 
Defendant. 
The Court having considered the defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and the various memoranda in support and in 
opposition thereto, the Motion to Strike the Affidavits of M. 
Dalton Cannon and David Lord and having heard oral argument in 
regard to said matters and being fully advised in the premises 
makes this its: 
MINUTE ENTRY 
The Motions to Strike are granted. The memorandum were 
filed untimely and in addition suffer the defects set forth in 
defendant's Motion to Strike and in particular points two and 
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three which the Court adopts as additional basis for the 
granting of said Motion. 
The Motion for Summary Judgment on behalf of the 
defendant is likewise granted. The Court is of the opinion that 
any duty which the University might have had in relation to 
escorting people across the street at the point of the incident 
involved in this case was at most a public duty. It can be 
argued that there was no public duty in that there is no showing 
that the University had any obligation to conduct traffic 
control measures at the particular crosswalk under any 
circumstances. The claim that there was a duty because of 
ownership has b€>en dropped by the plaintiff and the claim that 
there is a duty because of a landlord/tenant or business invitee 
concept does not stand up to scrutiny. The plaintiffs now admit 
that the University does not own the street where the incident 
occured so therefore they can in no way be the landlord or the 
tenant of said property it being a public road. Secondly, the 
plaintiff cannot boot strap a business invitee argument, even if 
it were valid, from the premises of the defendant to a premises 
the defendant does not own or occupy. The place of the accident 
was a public highway owned by the State of Utah and occupied 
only by the State and it's citizens. 
Returning to the question of duty, it is clear that the 
University need not* have conducted any crossing walk activities 
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had it chosen not to do so and in the event it had not, a member 
of the public injured at that location could not have 
complained. Under Ferree v. State, 784 P2d 149 (Utah, 1989) it 
is clear that the duty breached which forms the basis of the 
claim must be a duty owed specifically to the plaintiff and not 
to a general member of the public. The question that always 
arises in these kinds of cases is the attempt to classify each 
of the plaintiffs as falling within a given catagory. In this 
case the plaintiff attempts to classify as a member of a group 
of people attending a basketball game at the University of Utah 
or those persons crossing the roadway of this crosswalk. The 
Court is of the opinion that such classification is not 
appropriate and that does not create a duty running to a 
specific individual to wit: the plaintiffs in this case. It 
should be further noted that at the time and place of the 
accident the University, through their officers, was not in fact 
engaged in traffic control. While the police car was present 
and there is sufficient evidence to believe that there were 
flares burning in the crosswalk it was perfectly apparent that 
the officers were not present and were not going to conduct the 
plaintiffs across the intersection. As a matter of fact the 
testimony is undisputed that the plaintiffs noted that the 
officers were not present and would not be there to conduct them 
across the road as had been done on other occasions. Thereafter 
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they proceeded to cross, as would anybody else, and the accident 
occured without any further involvement from any agent of the 
University of Utah, Thus the University was not engaged in 
traffic control through their officers at the time and place of 
the accident and they had no specific duty to do so on behalf of 
the plaintiffs. The fact that the officers had been assigned by 
their superior the task of directing traffic, including helping 
people cross the street does not extend the duty owed by the 
University or the officer under the law. The scope of the 
assigned task, even if not fulfilled by the agent, cannot extend 
the duty of the privelge to a third party under these 
circumstances. For these reasons as well as those set forth in 
the defendant's Memorandum in Support of it's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and the Reply Memorandum in Support of it's Motion said 
Motion will be granted. 
Counsel for the defendant will prepare an appropriate 
order and summary judgment. 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Minute Entry, postage prepaid, to the following, 
this /0 day of March, 1992: 
Michael F. Richman 
John W. Andrews 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P, 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Scott A, Call 
Reeed M. Stringham 
Assistant Attorneys General 
Attorney for Defendant 
23 6 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
